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A R B I T R AT I O N
The authors surveyed the approaches of four European countries, Canada and Australia to determine the accuracy of
the U.S. perception that foreign countries ban all predispute arbitration clauses in the consumer and
employment contexts. They find no such bans in
the countries surveyed. This finding casts
doubt on the argument that Congress
should adopt the Arbitration Fairness
Act in order to bring the United
States into alignment with foreign countries. Accordingly,
the authors recommend
that Congress consider
the surveyed foreign
models before voting
on this bill.
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Arbitrating Disputes

Between

AND
Lessons from Abroad
ongress presently is considering
the most significant overhaul of
arbitration law in the United
States since the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) enactment in 1925.
This follows many previous efforts in
recent years to introduce bills that
would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in contracts of various kinds,
including those pertaining to consumer
purchases, terms of employment, livestock/poultry, franchises, motor vehicle
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ARBITRATION
sales, military reservists, nursing home admissions, and home mortgages.1 A central premise
underlying these bills is the idea that the parties
to these agreements (typically there is an individual on one side and a company on the other) tend
to occupy unequal bargaining positions. The
drafters of these bills conclude from this that the
individual’s choice to opt into arbitration before a
dispute has arisen cannot be considered free and
voluntary, and thus, the arbitration agreement
should be considered void and unenforceable.
Defenders of these bills claim
that the United States, when
compared to other nations,
stands alone in allowing pre-dispute agreements between companies and individuals to be
enforced.2 But is that true? We
set out to test this claim in order
to determine whether U.S. policy makers can learn anything
from their foreign counterparts. 3 Our research indicates
that the treatment of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in
other nations is not as portrayed
by proponents of these bills,
suggesting that Congress should
take these other approaches into
consideration before rushing to
adopt purported reforms.

claims arising under federal statutes—effectively
protected individuals from having to arbitrate
certain disputes with companies.6
The decline of this doctrine in the 1980s expanded the opportunities to use arbitration clauses in contracts between companies and individuals. Beginning in that decade, the U.S. Supreme
Court increasingly enforced arbitration agreements in disputes arising under federal statutes.
In quick succession, it permitted arbitration of
claims under the federal securities and employment discrimination laws and,
indeed, overruled an early nonarbitrability decision.7
While early efforts to undo
this pro-arbitrability jurisprudence received little support,
more measured legislative efforts
have succeeded. In the last seven
years, Congress has passed legislation barring the enforcement
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in contracts between credit
card companies and military personnel, between poultry wholesalers and farmers, and between
automobile manufacturers and
dealers (although President
Obama has just signed legislation
permitting this kind of arbitration8). An underlying premise of
these enactments was that they
were necessary to counteract the
company’s unfair bargaining
position in the arbitration agreements.
The success of these incremental changes has sparked a renewed interest in a more comprehensive ban on
enforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements
between companies and individuals. The boldest
effort, the bill called the Arbitration Fairness Act,
would retroactively invalidate pre-dispute agreements in employment, consumer, and franchise
agreements.9 Defenders of this bill argue that its
enactment would bring the United States into
line with other industrialized nations which, so
the argument goes, categorically prohibit arbitration in these contexts.10 The next section examines the validity of this claim.

The authors set
out to test the
proposition
that, of all the
industrialized
nations, only
the United
States allows
arbitration
of disputes
between companies and
individuals.

Arbitration at Home
Until the early 20th century,
questions over the enforceability
of arbitration agreements between companies and individuals
simply did not arise. Prior to the
enactment of the FAA in 1925, pre-dispute arbitration agreements largely were unenforceable.4
In the immediate decades following the FAA’s
enactment, arbitration agreements between individuals and companies received greater judicial
acceptance, but it was far from complete. The
FAA’s requirement that arbitration agreements be
enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” enabled courts to enforce some agreements
between companies and individuals involving
routine contract claims. Courts also would enforce arbitration clauses contained in collective
bargaining agreements (the underlying rationale
being that the labor union could effectively represent the interests of its members and, thereby,
effectively counterbalance the company’s bargaining position).5 Yet the “nonarbitrability doctrine”—which precluded arbitration of many
32

Arbitration Abroad
To test the proposition that, of all the industrialized nations, only the United States allows arbitration of disputes between companies and individuals, we examined European Union law as well
as the arbitration laws of four European countries
FEBRUARY/APRIL 2010

(the United Kingdom, France, Germany and
Switzerland) and two non-European countries
(Canada and Australia). We recognize that the
choice of countries is somewhat arbitrary.
Nonetheless, the countries we selected represent
both common law and civil law traditions, and are
among the most important arbitral forums in the
world. We included European law because of its
increasing importance and influence in both the
consumer and employment fields.
European Council Directive 93/13
In 1993, the European Community (EC) passed
Directive 93/13 which provides for a consumer
protection scheme within the European Union.11
Article 3(1) of this directive sets out the definition
of an unfair contractual term in consumer contracts. It states, “[a] contractual term which has not

Contracts Regulations 1999,” the U.K. regulations control all contractual relations between
consumers and businesses. They contain a “nonexhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair and includes arbitration among
them.”15 The term “consumer” is broadly defined
to include any “natural person who is acting for
purposes outside his trade, business, or profession.”16 It also lists a few circumstances in which
a contractual term (including one referring disputes exclusively to arbitration) will be regarded
as unfair.17 One of these circumstances involves a
contract term that is imposed on the other party
with no opportunity to negotiate it. Thus, the
regulations say: “A contractual term which has
not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the

This survey reveals a variety of approaches, ranging
from the more conservative approach of England,
to the more tolerant approach of Australia.
been individually negotiated shall be regarded as
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good
faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”
The annex to the directive states that a consumer arbitration clause that makes arbitration
the exclusive remedy meets the definition of an
“unfair term” in Article 3(1). But, because the
legislation is in the form of a directive as opposed
to a resolution, the European Council only requires Member States to institute domestic policies that are harmonious with the directive.
Therefore, Member States do not have to follow
the directive exactly as it is written. 12 Rather,
“[d]irectives bind EU members to the stated
goals, but the countries achieve directive purposes by changing their own laws, leaving wiggle
room on compliance.”13 The following European
countries, three of which are EU Member States
and one of which is not but often adopts EU regulations, have implemented this directive in their
own way, as seen below.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (U.K.) overhauled its
consumer arbitration regulations in 1999 when it
implemented EC Directive 93/13, the European
Community’s directive on consumer contracts.14
Known as the “Unfair Terms in Consumer
DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL

parties’ rights and obligations arising under the
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”
Another circumstance suggesting unfairness is
when the contract terms are boilerplate provisions, drafted before the current transaction.
Thus, the regulations say: “A term shall always be
regarded as not having been individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the
consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term.”18
Additionally, the regulations place the burden
on the seller to prove that a term was individually
negotiated.19 While the U.K. does place a restriction on the ability to contract pre-dispute for
arbitration—namely that the arbitration clause
must be negotiated for—it does not go so far as
to make every pre-dispute arbitration agreement
in a consumer contract void.
In the U.K., the arbitrability of employment
claims is affected by the nature of the action—
whether it is statutory or based on a private obligation. If arbitration is required by a private
employment agreement, the matter is subject to
the U.K. arbitration statute (Arbitration Act,
1996), which makes such agreements enforceable,
thereby providing a basis for arbitrability. If,
however, the plaintiff sues under statutory
employment protections, the matter can be arbitrated via the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) scheme, referred to in
33
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Section 7(1) of the Employment Rights (Dispute
Resolution) Act of 1998 (abbreviated as the
ER(DR)A 1998).20 This scheme allows parties to
avoid employment tribunals and to agree to arbitration after the dispute has arisen.21
France
France has also implemented EC Directive
91/13 through Article 132-1 of the Code de la consommation [France’s Consumer Code]. This provision states: “any clause in a contract concluded
between a seller or a supplier and a person who is
not acting in the course of his trade, business or
profession or a consumer shall be regarded as
unfair if its object or effect is to create, to the
detriment of that person or consumer, a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract.”22 The provision fur-

user are balanced against the objective interests
of the other contracting party. Subjective circumstances in any particular case usually will not be
taken into account.” 28 He goes on to say that
Section 310(3) requires the “specific circumstances accompanying the conclusion of a consumer contract” to be taken into consideration in
applying the unfairness test under Section 307.29
Other German laws can also apply to consumer arbitration agreements. German consumer
law, Ardizzoni says, allows arbitration clauses to
be implemented pre-dispute but requires them to
be written in an “intelligible and transparent
manner.” “Unclear or nonunderstandable terms”
have been held to violate the good faith requirement of Section 307(1).30
German arbitration law imposes strict form
requirements on cases in which consumers are

The varying approaches taken by the industrialized
nations surveyed here suggest that there are
other options Congress should consider before
taking action to change the current system.
ther states in the annex that an arbitration clause
may be statutorily unfair but it is the plaintiff’s
obligation to prove this.23
The bottom line is that France provides some
protections for consumers against unfair arbitration provisions but it puts the burden on them to
prove that the provision is unfair.
The ability to arbitrate employment law claims
in France depends upon whether the employer
still actively employs the employee when the
arbitration was commenced.24 While employed,
the Counseils des Prud’hommes—i.e., employment
tribunals—have exclusive jurisdiction over employment disputes and their authority cannot be
bypassed. 25 But once an employee is fired or
quits, the French Code du Travail allows the
employer and employee to arbitrate their claims
because the employee is no longer economically
reliant on the employer.26
Germany
The German implementation of EC Directive
93/13 is found in Sections 305-310 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch or
BGB).27 Section 307 BGB governs the unfairness
of contract terms. Marco Ardizzoni has described
the unfairness test as one of good faith: “In essence the unfairness test of Section 307 paragraphs 1-2 BGB requires that the interests of the
34

involved. Section 1031(5) of the German Civil
Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) generally requires
that the arbitration agreement be contained in a
separate and mutually signed document that solely
contains the agreement to arbitrate.31
In Germany, employers and employees can
agree to arbitrate under Sections 101 et seq. of
the German Labour Courts Act (ArbGG), but
they are required to use a “separate system of
arbitral proceedings”32 found in Sections 103-110
ArbGG. In particular, Section 103(1) ArbGG provides that an employment arbitral tribunal must
be composed of an equal number of workers and
employers. Impartial persons can act as additional
arbitrators.
Switzerland
Switzerland allows any claim involving an “economic interest” to be arbitrated.33 “The courts
interpret the term ‘economic interest’ in a very
broad manner, favoring arbitrability.”34 In general,
consumer disputes are arbitrable under Swiss law
because they are not preempted by Article 22 of
the Federal Law of the Forum in Civil Matters
(Bundesgesetzes über den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen
or GestG) the provision that places restrictions on
consumer disputes.35 However, there is some legal
doctrine to support the view that, due to the interaction of code provisions, consumer disputes are
FEBRUARY/APRIL 2010

only arbitrable under post-dispute arbitration
agreements.36 But, this is not the prevailing view.37
The arbitrability of employment disputes in
Switzerland is very similar to the arbitrability of
consumer disputes, except that Article 24 GestG
governs preemption. But, like consumer disputes,
employment disputes are arbitrable and not preempted. Further, Swiss courts have specifically
held employment disputes to be arbitrable.38
Non-European Union Countries
Canada
In Canada, under federal law, parties generally
are able to contract for arbitration before any dispute arises.39 Legislative limitations on the ability
to enforce pre-dispute consumer arbitration
clauses exist only in provincial law in the
provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Alberta.40 In
Ontario and Quebec, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are void in the consumer context and
cannot prevent a plaintiff from filing a class
action lawsuit or from becoming a member of a
class.41 In Alberta, the Fair Trading Act guarantees access to courts, including class action procedures, in respect to all causes of action under the
Act. 42 In order for a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement to be enforceable under the Fair
Trading Act, it must have received ministerial
approval.43 These limitations normally mean that
a stay of litigation in favor of arbitration will not
be granted.44 But, all three provinces allow consumers to agree to arbitration post-dispute.45
There is no similar prohibition on the arbitrability of class actions for employment disputes.46
Australia
Australia places only one federal limitation on
the arbitrability of consumer disputes.47 That
limitation applies only to insurance benefit disputes, and makes them non-arbitrable.48
By contrast, employment disputes are fully
arbitrable in a private setting. Most employment
arbitrations in Australia make use of the federal
Fair Work Australia scheme (the national workplace relations tribunal) because it is cheaper.49

Lessons from Abroad
The foregoing survey exposes a mistaken
premise in the current reform debate in the
United States. Contrary to the statements of
some reform advocates, foreign countries do not
all categorically preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements between companies
and individuals. Rather, our survey reveals a variety of approaches, ranging from the more conservative approach of England, to the more tolerant
approach of Australia. These varying approaches
suggest that the U.S. Congress has a far more
diverse menu of options than simply invalidating
pre-dispute consumer and employment arbitration agreements outright, or preserving the status
quo. For example, it could follow the French
model by codifying certain procedural protections in the FAA. Alternatively, it could follow
the German model by imposing certain formality
requirements on the arbitration agreement.
Whatever policy alternative it considers, Congress must keep in mind potentially salient differences between legal systems. For example, in contrast to the United States, many foreign countries
permit the prevailing party to recover its attorney’s fees. Further, foreign countries have a more
limited regime for class action and collective litigation. Most do not permit as extensive discovery
as U.S. courts do. Thus, the consequences of barring certain kinds of arbitration could have very
different effects here than they would if such a
ban were implemented abroad.
It behooves Congress to study closely the lessons from these nations, rather than blindly accept
unexamined claims about the foreign models that,
this article demonstrates, are simply inaccurate. It
would be unfortunate if Congress were to rush
headlong into reform without considering these
lessons from abroad and, indeed, the height of
irony if Congress were to invalidate such arbitration agreements in the belief that it was bringing
the United States into line with the systems of
other nations when, in fact, some of those very
same nations are moving more toward the
n
American model.

ENDNOTES
1 Institute for Legal Reform, 110th
Congress: Trial Lawyer Assault on
Arbitration Through Legislative Efforts/Earmarks, available at www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilr_docs/29/issue/ADR/LD.htm.
2 See Susan Lott et al., Report:
Mandatory Arbitration and Consumer
Contracts (Public Interest Advocacy
Center (PIAC), Nov. 4, 2004), available
at www.piac.ca/consumers/manda-

DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL

tory_arbitration_and_consumer_
contracts (describing mandatory arbitration clauses in the consumer context
as a “uniquely American experience”);
Joseph M. Matthews, “Are Florida
Courts Really Parochial When It
Comes to Arbitration?” 81 Fla. Bar J.
29 (2007) (“In fact, the U.S. Supreme
Court expansion of the FAA has
pushed the U.S. past most other developed nations, particularly those in

Europe, with respect to [arbitration],
which is the primary means of resolving disputes in the international
arena.”).
3 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, “Is
the U.S. Out on a Limb?” 56 U. Miami
L. Rev. 831 (2002).
4 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration 35 (2d. ed. 2001);
Richard E. Speidel, Common Legal
Issues in American Arbitration Law, in
35

ARBITRATION
America: A Critical Assessment at 36
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006), 1 Ian
R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration
Law: Agreements, Awards, and Remedies
under the Federal Arbitration Act § 4-5
(Little Brown 1996).
5 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 84 U.S. 909 (1964); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
6 Peter B. Rutledge, “Whither Arbitration?” 6 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 549,
553 (2008) [“Whither Arbitration”];
Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration —A
Good Deal for Consumers: A Response to
Public Citizen (U.S. Chamber Institute
for Legal Reform, available at
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
component/ilr_docs/29/issue/ADR/ST
U.html.
7 Whither Arbitration, supra n. 6, at
553-54; see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)
(compelling arbitration of a statutory
employment discrimination claim
based upon a pre-dispute arbitration
clause); Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989)
(finding that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements under the Securities Act
were enforceable); Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
242 (1987) (finding that consumers
could vindicate Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act claims via
arbitration).
8
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract
Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2) (2002); “Obama Signs DOD
Spending Bill Barring Employment
Arbitration by Military Contractors,”
65(1) Disp. Resol. J. 4 (Feb.-April 2010);
Peter B. Rutledge, “Common Ground
in the Arbitration Debate,” 1 Yearbook
of Arbitration & Mediation 52 (2009).
9 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, introduced in the House
on Feb. 12, 2009; S. 391, introduced in
the Senate on April 29, 2009.
10 See supra n. 2.
11 European Council Directive
93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (E.C.)
available at http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=celex:31993L0013:en:html.
12 “The Directive Is In: European
Union Strongly Backs Cross-Border
Mediation, 26 Alternatives to High Cost
of Litig. 119 (2008).
13 Id.
14 Enid A. Marshall, Gill: The Law of
Arbitration 76 (4th ed. Sweet & Maxwell
2001); see Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999
No. 2083 [Unfair Terms] (containing
36

the text of the statute).
15 Unfair Terms, supra n. 14, at Reg.
5(5), sched. 2, 1(q) (“excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take
legal action or exercise any other legal
remedy, particularly by requiring the
consumer to take disputes exclusively
to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence
available to him or imposing on him a
burden of proof which, according to
the applicable law, should lie with
another party to the contract”).
16 Id. at Reg. 3(1).
17 Id. at Reg. 5(1)-(2).
18 Id.
19 Id. at Reg. 5(4).
20 See Employment Rights (Dispute
Resolution) Act 1998, ch. 8, § 7(1).
21 See United Kingdom Department for Business Innovation & Skills,
Resolving Disputes, available at www.
berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/employment/R
esolving_disputes/index.html.
22
Hugh Beale & Denis Talon,
Cases, Materials, and Text on Contract
Law 526, 542 (Hart Publishing (UK)
2002).
23
Id. 526, 542; Jean-Louis Delvolvé
et al., French Arbitration Law and
Practice 54 (Kluwer 2003). Additionally, beyond the targeted consumer
provisions of the Code de la consommation, French Civil Code Article 2061
limits arbitrability to disputes between
professionals, implicitly excluding consumer contracts. Further, these provisions have been held to be inapplicable
to international disputes but that position has been criticized. See Gabrielle
Kauffmann-Kohler, “Online Dispute
Resolution and Its Significance for International Commercial Arbitration,”
in Global Reflections on International
Law, Commerce, and Dispute Resolution
(ICC 2005).
24 Delvolvé, supra n. 23, at 47.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 54.
27 Marco Ardizzoni, German Tax
and Business Law 1066 (Thomson/
Sweet & Maxwell 2005).
28 Id. at 1076.
29 Id. at 1066.
30 Id. at 1076.
31 Inka Hanefeld, chapter 7 on
Germany in Practitioner’s Handbook on
International Commercial Arbitration, at
7.12 (Frank-Bernd Weigand, ed., Oxford Univ. Press (USA) 2nd ed. 2010).
32 Patricia Nacimiento & Constantin Düchs, chapter on Germany, in
International Comparative Legal Guide
to: International Arbitration 2008 140
(Alan Falach, et al., eds., Global Legal

Group (UK) 2008).
33 Felix Dasser & Balz Gross, chapter on Switzerland, in International
Comparative Legal Guide to International
Arbitration 2008, supra n. 32, at 260.
34 Id.
35 Markus Wirth, “Kommentar zu
Art. 9,” in Gerichtsstandegesetz, Kommentar zum Bundesgesetz über den
Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen art. 1 n.2425 (eds. von Thomas Müller/Markus
Wirth, [Commentary on Article 9, in
the Jurisdiction Act, Commentary on
Federal Law on Jurisdiction in Civil
Matters].
36 Wolfgang Portmann & JeanFritz Stöckli, Schweizerisches Arbeitsrecht 275 (Dike Verlag 2007). [Swiss
Industrial Law].
37 Id.
38 Oscar Vogel & Karl Spuhler,
Grundriss des Zivilprozessrechts und des
internationalen Zivilprozessrechts in der
Schweiz ch. 14, ¶ 34 (Stämpflis juristische Lehrbücher 8th ed. Bern 2006)
[Plan of Civil Procedure and International Civil Procedural Law in Switzerland].
39
Babak Barin et al., Osler Guide to
Commercial Arbitration in Canada 41
(Kluwer Law Int’l 2006).
40
Id. See Lott, supra n. 2, at 52
(stating that there is no national Canadian prohibition on “mandatory arbitration clauses”).
41
Consumer Protection Act, 2002,
R.S.O. 2009, ch. 30, §§ 7(2) & 8(1)
[Ontario Act]; Lott, supra n. 2, at 48;
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q.
2009, ch. P-40.1, § 11.1 [Quebec Act].
42
Fair Trading Act, R.S.A. 2000,
ch. F-2, § 13(1) [Alberta Act].
43 Id. at § 16.
44 Jonnette Watson Hamilton,
“Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration
Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?”
51 McGill L.J. 693, 704-19 (2006)
(noting uncertainties in the case law).
45 Quebec Act, supra n. 43, at § 11.1
(2); Ontario Act, supra n. 43, at §§ 7(5)
& 8(4); Alberta Act, n. 44, supra, at §
16.
46 Barin, supra n. 39.
47 Lott, supra n. 2, at 45.
48 Insurance Contracts Act, 1984,
§ 43 (Austl.); Lott, supra n. 2, at 4;
Michael C. Pryles, International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration Suppl. 26
8 ( Jan Paulsson ed., in cooperation
with the T.M.C. Asser Instituut &
ICCA, Kluwer Law & Taxation 1998).
49 See Fair Work Act, 2009, ch. 3
(Austl.) available at www.austlii.edu.
au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/fwa
2009114/.
FEBRUARY/APRIL 2010

Copyright of Dispute Resolution Journal is the property of American Arbitration Association Inc. and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

